Estate Taxes and Charitable Bequests: Evidence from Two Tax Regimes by David Joulfaian
 
ESTATE TAXES AND CHARITABLE BEQUESTS: 





Office of Tax Analysis 
US Department of the Treasury 
1500 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 






Department of Economics 
George Washington University 








Much of the literature on the effects of estate taxation on charitable bequests has relied on 
cross sectional data, reflecting the uniqueness of death. Few have explored longitudinal 
data to exploit exogenous variations in tax regimes. The latter, however, continue to be 
susceptible to omitted variable as well as measurement error biases attributable to changes 
in the treatment of spousal bequests and frequent changes in tax regimes. This paper 
explores the effects of the estate tax on charitable bequests using administrative data from 
two tax regimes where earlier biases are minimized. The deductibility of charitable 
bequests is found to have significant implications for giving. However, the effects of estate 
tax repeal are much smaller. These findings are sensitive to expectations of the tax regime 
in effect at time of death. 
 
 
JEL Fields: D19, H24, H31 





The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the 
Department of the Treasury.  
I. Introduction 
Individuals save for a variety of reasons. For some, savings is bequest motivated, 
be it altruistic or strategic in nature. For others, it may reflect the simple desire to 
accumulate wealth. Regardless of the motivation, wealthy savers may have preset 
preferences as to how to divide their accumulated wealth among the various donees and 
heirs at death. Estate and inheritance taxes, by altering relative prices, may alter the 
division of these bequests.  Even in the case of accidental bequests, savers may not be too 
indifferent as to how their unplanned terminal wealth is ultimately divided between the 
government and potential heirs. 
Because bequests to charitable organizations are deductible in computing the estate 
tax liability, estate taxation lowers the price of such transfers relative to those to children. 
At the very same time, the estate tax lowers after-tax terminal wealth and the potential size 
of inheritances. These tendencies raise important policy considerations related to how 
changes in estate tax rates, including the elimination of the estate tax, may affect giving. 
Indeed, charitable bequests and the potential effects of estate taxation continue to attract 
attention, and feature prominently in the debate on taxing inheritances in the United States.  
With the wealthy leaving behind some $20 billion in charitable bequests annually, the 
implications of public policy for these sizeable transfers are worthy of study. 
  Much of the literature, reflecting the uniqueness of death, has relied on cross-
sectional data in exploring the sensitivity of bequests to the estate tax. Individuals are 
assumed to choose between bequests to charity and bequests to children (and other heirs) 
by implicitly setting the marginal rate of substitution between the two to equal the relative 
price of charitable bequests. The price of spousal bequests is ignored and the estate tax is 
  1assumed, implicitly or explicitly (Joulfaian, 2000a), not to affect the choice between 
spousal and charitable bequests.
1
  Many of the existing studies find large tax price elasticities suggesting that the 
deductibility is a significant stimulant to giving.
 2 Many also find large wealth elasticities, 
which suggests that the estate tax, by lowering “bequeathable” or disposable wealth, has a 
dampening effect on giving. These estimates are not without their critics. Identifying the 
effects of progressive estate tax rates separately from wealth (Feenberg, 1987), for 
instance, may represent a serious challenge in evaluating the effects of estate taxation 
especially as only cross sectional data are available, again reflecting the uniqueness of 
death (Poterba, 1998).  Joulfaian (2000a) employs variations in state tax rates to address 
this concern. Others, however, such as Barthold and Plotnick (1984), the only study to date 
to have employed longitudinal micro data, and more recently Kopczuk and Slemrod (2003) 
and Bakija, Gale, and Slemrod (2003), resort to pooling cross sectional or aggregated time 
series data over a long period where numerous changes in tax regimes have taken place. 
  Generally, it is difficult to draw inferences from the observed trend in aggregate 
bequests (Auten, Clotfelter, and Schmalbeck , 2000, Table 12-7). Kopczuk and Slemrod 
(2003), hereafter KS, resort to time series analysis of such aggregate data to discern how 
                                                 
1  This assumption reflects the full deductibility of spousal and charitable bequests (tax 
price of one), an assumption that may not be appropriate when using pre-1982 data as the 
tax treatment diverged. 
2  See McNees (1973), Boskin (1976), Feldstein (1977), Clotfelter (1985), Joulfaian (1991, 
2000a, 2001), Auten and Joulfaian (1996), Greene and McClelland (2001), and 
McClelland (2004). 
  2variations in tax regimes over time influenced the observed trend in giving.  KS conclude 
that the effect of the estate tax can be larger than what has been reported earlier, an implicit 
reference to the predicted 12 percent reduction in bequests reported in Joulfaian (2000a), 
but do not report estimates of this effect. More recently, Bakija, Gale, and Slemrod (2003), 
hereafter BGS, refine the work of KS and employ “pooled” grouped data. BGS exclude the 
estates of married decedents, and report results that suggest charitable bequests would 
seize to take place in the aftermath of estate tax repeal.
 3 Using parameters from BGS, 
Bakija and Gale (2003) report estate tax repeal would reduce charitable bequests by 37 
percent. In contrast, Barthold and Plotnick (1984), who employ pooled Connecticut 
probate records for the 1930s and 1940s, a period characterized by frequent changes in tax 
regimes, find taxes to have virtually no effect on giving.
4
  Large donors are likely to be very wealthy who may also face high tax rates by 
virtue of the progressive tax rate schedule. Thus it is difficult to disentangle the effects of 
wealth separately from those of high tax rates on giving. Resorting to pooled cross 
sectional or time series aggregate data is one way to address this identification problem as 
                                                 
3  More specifically, BGS employ IRS data for select years grouped into five wealth 
categories expressed in 1996 dollars; $400,000 to $750,000; $750,000 to $1.25 million; 
$1.25 to $2 million; $2 to 5 million; and over $5 million. Using TSLS, BGS report price 
and wealth elasticities of -2.1 and 1.55, respectively, and state that  “eliminating estate and 
inheritance taxes would have raised the price of charitable bequests by 77 percent, on 
average, while raising disposable wealth by an average of only 24 percent” in 1998. 
4  Using evidence from a recent survey, Schervish and Havens (2003) report charitable 
bequests to increase in the aftermath of estate tax repeal. 
 
  3they exploit variations in statutory tax rates, changes that are independent of wealth 
variations. But this may also introduce a number of other biases, or at the very least 
exacerbate them.
5 As Clotfelter (1985, pp. 240) points out, the price term is likely to be 
measured with error during periods of frequent changes in tax rates because it is not clear 
whether reported charitable bequests are influenced by current or past tax rates. In 
addition, there is also the question of whether planned bequests reflect future taxes, as 
estate planning by its very nature is forward looking. Indeed, the swift adjustment in 
spousal bequests documented in Bernheim (1987) highlights the importance of 
expectations.  
Furthermore, studies typically assume that individuals face a tax price for charity 
measured relative to the price of bequests to children (and other heirs). But married 
individuals, for instance, may leave their estates to their children, charity, as well as to 
their spouses. If transfers to these three recipients face different tax regimes, then the price 
of spousal bequests also needs to be considered, as well as the implications for the 
measured after-tax wealth. This omitted variable problem, as well as the ensuing errors in 
measuring the budget constraint, may have motivated BGS to exclude married decedents 
from their study. However, excluding married individuals may not adequately solve these 
problems. 
  Bernheim (1987) document how spousal bequests increased in the aftermath of 
introducing the unlimited marital deduction in 1982. The change in tax regimes, by setting 
                                                 
5  In addition, some serious thought should be given to the appropriateness of using the 
attributes of one dead person as lagged variables for those of another dead person as 
observed in recent longitudinal studies. 
  4a tax rate of zero for spousal transfers, seems to have stimulated additional transfers to 
spouses very likely at the expense of transfers to charity. Cognizant of these effects, BGS 
exclude married decedents. But because spousal bequests increase the wealth of the 
surviving spouse, and potentially the concomitant tax price, they may also influence giving 
in the future. Consequently, the omitted tax price of spousal bequests and errors in 
measuring the budget constraint and the tax price faced by widowed decedents don’t go 
away. In a more recent paper, Bakija, Gale, and Slemrod (2005), expand their earlier work 
and attempt to control for the price of spousal bequests. 
  Data on the never married singles and those divorced or separated are immune from 
measurement errors and specification bias caused by changes in the treatment of spousal 
bequests over time. But findings from such longitudinal data, that is yet to be explored, 
may not be viewed as very meaningful in explaining the pattern of giving and the estate tax 
effects as widowed (and married) decedents account for the bulk of giving. Indeed, the 
latter group accounts for much of the wealth held by the super rich as well. Thus, the 
challenge is to find periods or tax regimes where wealth is consistently measured over time 
and less susceptible to measurement errors. 
In this paper I explore the effects of the estate tax on charitable bequests using 
estate tax data on widowed, as well as divorced and never married single decedents. 
However, and in order to minimize measurement related problems, I examine data on 
decedents in 1976 and 1982, two regimes that embody substantially different tax rate 
schedules but where the measurement of wealth and charitable bequests is virtually 
  5identical.
6  Descriptive statistics on the pattern of giving in 1976 and 1982 show that 
giving to charity did not decline in the aftermath of tax rate reductions in 1982, and suggest 
that estate taxation may have little effect on bequests. This is a finding that is further 
confirmed by multivariate analysis. 
  The paper is organized as follows. Section II explores issues related to modeling 
the effects of estate taxation on charitable bequests for married couples. Section III 
describes the data and presents some basic results, while section IV provides some 
econometric findings. Section V concludes. 
 
II. Modeling Charitable Bequests 
A married individual faces at least three options in disposing of terminal wealth 
accumulated over a lifetime. He may bequeath his wealth to his surviving spouse, transfer 
it to his children (and other relatives and friends), or donate it to charity. If the estate tax 
treats these transfers differentially, then this may influence the allocation of bequests 
amongst the survivors. As such, an individual’s objective is then to determine how to 
allocate this terminal wealth among the three potential donees. 
                                                 
6  In 1976, spousal bequests were deductible to the extent they did not exceed one half the 
estate. These bequests became fully deductible in 1982. As such, post 1982 data on 
widowed decedents grow less compatible over time depending on the size of spousal 
bequest and the remaining life expectancy of the surviving spouse (see Joulfaian, 1998, 
Table 19). Available pre-1970 data is also not compatible given the dramatic changes in 
the tax treatment of charities introduced by the Tax Reform Act of 1969. 
  6  More formally, and in a very simple model, an individual's utility is determined by 
charitable bequests (C), bequests to heirs (B), and spousal bequests (S) at death in period 1, 
or: 
 
(1)     
γ β α S B C U 1 1 1 =
 
The individual maximizes his utility subject to a budget constraint which requires that 
expenditures on charitable and non-charitable bequests not exceed the individual's terminal 
wealth W, or: 
  
(2)      1 1 1 W S P B P C P S B C ≤ + +
  
where PC denotes the tax price of charitable bequests, PS for spousal bequests, PB for 
bequests to children and others defined as PB =1/(1-T’). At a marginal tax rate T’ of 0.55, it 
will cost the donor $2.22 for every $1 in bequests (B).  In contrast, bequests to charity are 
exempt from taxation as they are deductible in computing the estate tax. Similarly, spousal 
bequests are fully deductible. Thus, PC = PS  =1, or the more familiar 1-T’ when stated 
relative to the price of bequests to heirs. Before 1982, however, spousal bequests were 
deductible only to the extent that they did not exceed 50 percent of the estate. Thus, the 
price of spousal bequests was one when these bequests were less than one half the gross 
estate (PS  =1), and PS  =1/(1-T’) when they exceeded this threshold.  
Solving for the first-order conditions, not surprisingly spousal bequests decline 
with its tax price, or: 
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This is consistent with the experience in the aftermath of the introduction of the unlimited 
marital deduction, i.e., T’=0, in 1982 (Bernheim, 1987). Spousal bequests reported in 1982, 
when measured relative to the wealth of the estates, were 50 percent larger than the amount 
that is likely to have been reported under the law in effect in 1976 (Joulfaian, 2000b). 
  The surviving spouse is also faced with a similar, albeit limited, set of choices at 
death in period 2. More specifically, her choice is how to allocate her own accumulated 
wealth (WS) plus wealth inherited from her spouse (S) between bequests to her children 
(B) and charity (C). More specifically, she maximizes her utility:
7
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subject to the budget constraint that her transfers do not exceed her terminal wealth W2: 
 
(5)      2 2 2 W B P C P B C ≤ +
                                                 
7  I ignore discounting to simplify the exposition. 
  8where her terminal wealth consists of her own accumulated wealth plus bequests from her 






 from (3), for a given WS; the terminal wealth 
of the spouse in period 2 is influenced by the tax regime in period 1. Equally important is 
the influence of spousal bequests on the observed tax price of giving to charity in period 2 
as T2 = T(WS+S). 
 
Solving for the first order conditions yields, 
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which suggests that charitable bequests by the surviving spouse in period 2 are influenced 
by the terminal wealth of the first to die, W1, and the price of spousal bequests PS in period 
1.
8  In other words, we cannot ignore the effects of the tax regime in period 1 on giving and 
wealth in period 2 for widowed individuals. 
 
                                                 
8  In an alternative treatment, husband and wife may maximize joint utility subject to a 
common budget constraint in deciding how to allocate charitable bequests between the 
two. This, however, may require commitment on the part of the surviving spouse. 
  9III. Preliminary Look at Estate Tax Data 
In moving away from the reliance on cross sectional estate tax data, the challenge 
in using longitudinal data is to control for the tax treatment of transfers to various donees 
as well as the frequently changing tax regimes. In particular, and as demonstrated above, 
the treatment of spousal transfers is the most problematic and commonly ignored in the 
literature. One approach to addressing this problem is to simply exclude married 
decedents. As eluded to earlier, however, this continues to overlook the influence of 
spousal bequests on the observed wealth of the surviving spouse (the second to die), which 
itself can be determined by past tax regimes. 
  In this paper, I resort to estate tax data for decedents in 1976 and 1982, years when 
the data on widowed decedents is the least tainted by tax induced changes in spousal 
bequests.
9 The tax Code in effect in 1976 had been in place virtually unaltered since 1954, 
except for the restrictions on gifts to certain charities, private foundations in particular, 
introduced by the 1969 Tax Reform Act. The intent of this act was to effectively reduce 
transfers to beneficiaries disguised as charitable gifts. The tax rate schedules in effect in 
1982 were ushered by the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA81), enacted on 
August 13, 1981, and are markedly lower than those in effect in 1976. These rate 
reductions had been in part anticipated as early as November 1980, following the outcome 
of the Presidential elections. Equally important, the wealth reported by widowed decedents 
in the two periods reflects the 1976 tax treatment of spousal bequests, as the full marital 
deduction took effect for married decedents in 1982. Thus, we observe the pattern of 
giving to charity in the presence of exogenous variations in tax rates, as well as wealth 
                                                 
9  Comprehensive data for the years 1977 through 1981 do not exist. 
  10measures for widowed decedents that are not influenced by changes in the marital 
deduction. 
  The maximum tax rate in effect in 1976 was 77 percent. ERTA81 reduced the 
maximum tax rate in steps to 50 percent by 1985. The enabling legislation also introduced 
a “unified” tax credit which effectively exempted the first $225,000 in taxable estate in 
1982, set to gradually increase to $600,000 by 1987. The tax rate schedule in effect in the 
intervening years is illustrated in Table 1. 
  Data on estate tax decedents in 1976 is available only for returns filed in 1977; 
returns filed in 1976 and after 1977 are not available. Returns with gross estates in excess 
of $500,000 are sampled at 100 percent; at 20 percent for those under $500,000. In 
contrast, population data for 1982 decedents is available for returns filed in 1982 through 
1984, but only for those with estates in excess of $1 million; the less wealthy are sampled 
at an average rate of 30 percent. While estate tax returns are required to be filed within 9 
months of the date of death, some are filed much later.
 10 Anecdotal evidence suggests that 
late filers are likely to be distinctly different in terms of wealth and sophisticated estate 
planning.
11 Thus, to enhance the comparability of the two data sets, I limit the data on 
decedents in 1982 to estate tax returns filed in 1983, and discard those filed in 1982 and 
                                                 
10  Typically, some 15 percent of estate tax returns of decedents in a given year are filed in 
the year of death; 80 percent during the following year, and the remainder in later years. 
11  Indeed, regressing the log of wealth of decedents in 1982 on the year an estate tax return 
is filed yields a coefficient of 0.13 (se=0.01), implying that reported wealth is on average 
13 percent higher for each year returns are filed late. 
  111984. In addition, only estates in excess of $300,000 in 1982 dollars, the SOI sampling 
threshold for returns filed in 1983, are considered.
12
  To motivate the analysis, I first restrict the sample to widowed and married 
decedents. Their pattern of charitable bequests over the two periods is summarized in 
Figure 1A-B. Figure 1A shows the probability of giving to rise with wealth. Similarly, 
Figure 1B shows the share of wealth transferred to also rise with wealth. But given the 
progressive tax rate schedules in Table 1, this may also suggest that giving rises with tax 
rates as well. The fraction of estates giving as well as the share of wealth transferred is 
generally lower for estates in 1982 than their counterparts in 1976 when tax rates were 
higher, particularly for the wealthiest of estates. This may lead us to conclude that lower 
tax rates depressed giving in 1982. 
  However, and as demonstrated in Figure 2, much of the trend observed in Figure 1 
is reversed when married decedents are excluded and the focus is restricted to widowed 
decedents. Indeed, in the case of the wealthiest of estates, those in excess of $20 million, 
the share of wealth transferred almost doubles.
13 Despite the tax rate reductions, the 
“generosity” of the very wealthy seems to have increased. 
  Figure 3 sheds some light on the diverging trends observed above. Married 
decedents, virtually across all wealth cohorts, seem to leave smaller bequests to charity in 
1982 compared to the trend observed for 1976.  In contrast, and more interestingly, Figure 
4 exhibits a surge in spousal bequests for all wealth categories, which is very likely to have 
                                                 
12  The filing requirement was $225,000 for decedents in 1982. 
13  Note that this group accounts for one half the bequests reported in the sample, weighted 
or otherwise. 
  12taken place at the expense of charitable bequests. Figures 3 and 4, combined, make the 
case that potential findings from longitudinal data on the effects of estate taxation can be 
biased if spousal bequests and their consequences for the evolution of wealth are not 
properly controlled for. 
  Controlling for spousal bequests and their ultimate disposition is rather a difficult 
task, particularly as it requires the tracking of married couples across time and tax regime. 
As such, I focus only on widowed, never married singles, and divorced/separated 
decedents. The resulting sample consists of 14,051 estates, with about 55 percent 
representing decedents in 1976. Table 2 provides summary statistics for select variables, 
with all amounts stated in $1982. The mean charitable bequest CB is $287,300, with about 
one third giving to charity. Net of the tax savings from its deductibility, the mean after-tax 
bequest is $114,900, measured as CB-(T0-T), where T is actual tax paid and T0 is the tax 
liability computed by setting charitable bequests to zero; T=T(W-CB) and T0=T(W). These 
estates are large with mean wealth W of about $1.6 million, and standard error of $17 
million.
14 Net of taxes paid, as well as the tax savings from deducting charitable bequests, 
i.e. W-T0, disposable wealth is $886,500. This represents the maximum amount that can be 
transferred to the heirs. The average tax price P=(1-T’) is 0.65. When evaluated using fully 
phased-in tax law, the after-tax wealth and charitable bequests, as well as the tax price, are 
higher. 
Comparing those who give to those who don’t give, and as illustrated in columns 2 
and 3 of Table 2, we find that the sample of donors are wealthier with mean wealth of $2.6 
million compared to $1 million for non-donors. They are also older with mean age of 81 
                                                 
14  Wealth is defined as net worth less estate expenses. 
  13years compared to 76 years for non-donors, and more likely to have never married. 
However, there seems to be very little difference in observed tax prices particularly when 
the fully phased-in tax law is used. 
 
IV. Multivariate Analysis 
  I employ multivariate analysis to further gauge the effects of estate taxation, and 
control for the other determinants of charitable bequests.  The latter include demographic 
variables such as age, gender, and marital status, as well as bequeathable or disposable 
wealth. Of particular interest is how these variables, the tax price and wealth in particular, 
influence the observed budget share (ω) allocated to charity. More specifically, I estimate 
the following equation for estate i in period t, where w is disposable wealth, W-T0, or the 
maximum amount that can be transferred to the heirs, and Z is a vector of demographic 
attributes, or: 
(8)  t i t i t i t i t i Z w p , , , , , ln ln ε γ θ α ω + + + =  
  Borrowing from Randolph (1995) adaptation of the AIDS model, the budget share 
is defined as CB(1–T’)/(W- T0).  A critical variable in explaining charitable giving is the 
tax price. This price, however, is likely to be endogenous to the size of bequests, as they 
reduce the size of the taxable estate; T=T(W-CB).  Consequently, the tax price is 
instrumented using the first dollar tax price on charity. This marginal tax rate is derived by 
setting charitable bequests to zero and assuming $1,000 in gifts for all estates. As with all 
previous longitudinal studies on charitable bequests, the tax price is measured using the tax 
law in effect in the year of death even though changes in tax regimes are known in 
advance. This restriction is relaxed later on, where the future tax price is employed.
  14  Reflecting the censored nature of the data, FIML Tobit is employed in estimating 
(8) with results reported in Table 3. Beginning with demographic variables, the never 
married singles, as well as those divorced or separated bequeath more than their widowed 
counterparts. Gender seems to have some effect on giving, with male decedents leaving 
behind smaller bequests.  Bequests rise with age, but at a declining rate.  Those from the 
west or the south seem to be less generous. 
  Turning to the key variables of interest, and beginning with wealth, the estimated 
coefficient is 0.094 with a standard error of 0.009.  In contrast, the coefficient on the tax 
price is negative with an estimated value of -0.124 and standard error of 0.057.  Using 
these estimated parameters, the predicted change in bequests is measured for each estate i 
in period t by first deriving the expected or fitted value for bequests from (8), or: 
() () [] {}
1
0 0 ln ln
− + + − + Φ − = P Z T W P T W CB φσ γ θ α  
and comparing it to the value predicted after setting all the tax values to zero, i.e. T=T’=0, 
or: 
() [] φσ γ θ + + Φ = Z W W CB ln  
where Φ=Φ(β’x/σ) and φ=φ(β’x/σ) are the distribution and density functions of the 
standard normal which vary with the tax regime embodied in the set of regressors x. 
  Other things equal, these estimates suggest that in the absence of the estate tax, 
charitable bequests would decline by 3 percent, from a predicted weighted mean bequest of 
$87,600 down to $84,300 (see bottom of Table 3). At the same time, the probability Φ of 
making such bequests declines from a predicted 33 percent to 28 percent. Charitable 
bequests are predicted to decline by about 65 percent to $30,600 (sd=861,500) if only their 
deductibility were to be repealed. 
  15  The above measures of wealth and price reflect the year of death consistent with the 
convention employed in earlier longitudinal studies. However, given the phased in 
reductions in tax rates from 65 to 50 percent over the period 1982 and 1985, as well as the 
gradual expansion in the effective exemption from $225,000 in 1982 to $600,000 by 1987, 
the calculated tax rates in effect in the year of death may not reflect the true margin at 
which decisions are made. Indeed, and unless death in 1982 was perfectly anticipated, wills 
drawn or amended in 1981 and 1982, may very well reflect the fully phased-in law. The 
phased-in tax regime has implications for the measured budget share, after tax wealth, as 
well as the tax price. 
  To gauge the sensitivity of the above estimates to this possibility, the parameters in 
column one of Table 3 are re-estimated using the fully phased-in law. In other words, the 
maximum tax rate in effect is now 50 percent, and not the 65 percent in effect in 1982. 
Similarly, the size of the exempted estate is $600,000 instead of $225,000. The results are 
reported in column 2.  Most of the coefficients estimated for the fully phased-in regime are 
somewhat different from those reported earlier. More specifically, the wealth coefficient is 
estimated with a value of 0.133 (se=0.007), significantly larger than the earlier estimate.  
The tax price coefficient is now positive, with a value of 0.06 (se=0.03). Combined, the 
estimates point to a much higher wealth effect. Repealing the estate tax increases predicted 
bequests by about 62 percent, from a mean of $85,100 to $139,100, while repealing only 
the deductibility of charitable bequests would reduce it by a third down to $59,300 
(sd=1,332,400). 
  For presentational purposes, wealth and price elasticity coefficients are calculated 
for each observation. The wealth elasticity is estimated as: 
  161 ) (
1
+ Φ = z w ω
β η  
and price elasticity as: 
1 ) (
1
− Φ = z P ω
α η  
Using the actual budget share for each observation, the overall charitable bequest weighted 
wealth elasticity is 1.16, with a price elasticity of -1.21. In contrast, the wealth and price 
elasticity coefficients become 1.2 and -0.9, respectively, when future law is considered. 
In an alternative set of estimates, the budget share is defined as [CB-(T0–T)]/(W- 
T0) consistent with Joulfaian (2000).
15 Under a proportional tax system, the two measures 
of the budget share would be identical except when the entire estate is left to charity; T’=0 
but T0-T>0.
16  The estimated effects are quite different from those observed in Table 3. As 
shown in Table 4, the wealth and price estimated coefficients are consistent with those 
reported earlier in Table 3. In the absence of the estate tax, bequests decline by 13 percent, 
from a predicted weighted mean of $104,200 to $90,800. On the other hand, and using the 
future tax regime, the predicted bequests rise by three percent, from a mean of $105,300 to 
$108,500.  The predicted or expected bequest for each observation is derived from: 
() () [] {} ( ) T T Z T W P T W CB − + + + − + Φ − = 0 0 0 ln ln φσ γ θ α  
and contrasted with that predicted in the absence of an estate tax, or: 
                                                 
n
15  The numerator may be restated as  which reflects the convexity of the tax rate 





16  This is an unlikely outcome and less of a concern under the income tax, as in Randolph 
(1995), where the deduction is limited to 50 percent or less of AGI. 
  17() [] φσ γ θ + + Φ = Z W W CB ln  
The divergent, though qualitatively similar, results highlight the importance of the 
specification employed in gauging the effects of estate taxation. The predicted change in 
bequests in case of repeal of the estate tax ranges from -13 to +3 percent when the latter 
specification is employed as in Table 4, compared to -3 to +62 percent in case of the earlier 
specification which employs a linear measure of the budget share.  The specification in 
Table 4, however, has a greater predictive power. It predicts an average bequest of 
$104,200 compared to $87,600 in the alternative specification; the actual is $124,000. In 
addition, it predicts a maximum bequest well over $1 billion, pretty close to the actual, 
compared to a maximum under $300 million using the specification in Table 3. 
  The above estimated effects change considerably, but not qualitatively, when 
estates with wealth in excess of $20 million are excluded.
17 In case of estate tax repeal, and 
using the specification in Table 3, bequests decline by 20 percent using the year of death 
law and increase by 18 percent using future law. In contrast, bequests increase by 13 and 
15 percent, respectively, using the specification in Table 4. The gap in the estimated effects 
highlights the importance of the presence of the wealthiest group, and points to the 
potential aggregation bias common to grouped and aggregated time series data. 
  It is interesting to note that there is little change in the qualitative results when the 
data is limited to the never-married singles. Using the specification in Table 3, charitable 
bequests by this group would decline by 12 percent if the estate tax were repealed. 
                                                 
17  This reduces the sample size to 14,010 observation with mean bequests of 65,900 and 
sd=399,600. The excluded observations number 41, with mean 54,046,100 and 
sd=215,371,400, and account for about half of all bequests. 
  18However, they would increase by 18 percent using future law measure of the tax price. 
Similarly, and using the specification in Table 4, bequests would increase by 31 percent, or 




This paper explores the effects of the estate tax on charitable bequests using two tax 
regimes where wealth is less susceptible to measurement errors. More specifically, I 
employ estate tax data for decedents in 1976 and 1982 and exclusively focus on widowed 
and unmarried decedents. 
Tax rates were significantly reduced in 1982 and later years, yet descriptive 
statistics show that higher charitable bequests, relative to wealth, were observed in 1982 
compared to the trend in 1976 when tax rates were higher. This trend suggests that estate 
taxation has little effect on bequests. Except for the stimulating effect of the deductibility 
of bequests, a similar conclusion is arrived at using multivariate analysis. 
This paper also highlights the sensitivity of estimates to the expected tax regime in 
effect at death. In the period examined, the estimated effects of estate taxation vary 
considerably depending on whether behavior and estate planning reflect the current or 
expected tax regimes. If donors are assumed to respond to the tax regime in place at the 
date of death, then estate tax repeal would lead to a small reduction in bequests. On the 
other hand, if donors plan with the future tax regime in mind, then estate tax repeal may 
lead to a small increase in gifts. However, given the lack of data on when wills are drafted 
or amended, it is difficult to determine which tax regime is binding. This suggests that we 
                                                 
18  Note that no observation in 1976 reported wealth in excess of $20 million. 
  19should be cautious in employing longitudinal data, as well as interpreting results obtained 
from studies using such data. 
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  22Table 1 
 
Estate Tax Rate Schedule, by Year and Size of Taxable Estate (amounts in $000s) 
 
Taxable  Estate  Range 1976 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
         -                 5  3             18               18               18               18               18               18  
        5            10  7             18               18               18               18               18               18   
     10            20  11             20               20               20               20               20               20   
     20            30  14             22               22               22               22               22               22   
      30            40  18             22               22               22               22               22               22   
      40            50  22             24               24               24               24               24               24   
      50            60  25             24               24               24               24               24               24   
      60            80  28             26               26               26               26               26               26   
      80          100  28             28               28               28               28               28               28   
    100   150  30  30  30  30  30  30  30 
    150          200  30  32  32  32  32  32  32 
    200          225  30  32  32  32  32  32  32 
225 250 30 32 32  32  32  32  32 
    250          275  32  34  34  34  34  34  34 
275 325 32 34 34 34  34  34  34 
325 400 32 34 34 34 34  34  34 
    400          500  32  34  34  34  34  34  34 
    500          600  35  37  37  37  37  37  37 
    600          750  35  37  37  37  37  37  37 
    750          800  37  39  39  39  39  39  39 
    800       1,000  37  39  39  39  39  39  39 
 1,000       1,250  39  41  41  41  41  41  41 
 1,250       1,500  42  43  43  43  43  43  43 
 1,500       2,000  45  45  45  45  45  45  45 
 2,000       2,500  49  49  49  49  49  49  49 
 2,500       3,000  53  53  53  53  50  50  50 
 3,000       3,500  56  57  57  55  50  50  50 
 3,500       4,000  59  61  60  55  50  50  50 
 4,000       4,500  63  65  60  55  50  50  50 
 4,500       5,000  63  65  60  55  50  50  50 
 5,000       6,000  67  65  60  55  50  50  50 
 6,000       7,000  70  65  60  55  50  50  50 
 7,000       8,000  73  65  60  55  50  50  50 
 8,000     10,000  76  65  60  55  50  50  50 
10,000    and over   77  65  60  55  50  50  50 
Exemption 60  0  0 0 0 0 0 
Exempted  Estate*  0 225 275 325 400 500 600 
 
 
* Size of estate ($000s) exempt from federal estate tax by virtue of the unified credit which 
reduces the infra marginal tax rates in the shaded area to zero. The taxable estate is not 
reduced by any exemption. Note that the sample excludes observations with wealth under 
$300,000.
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  27Table 2 
Sample Means for Select Variables (standard deviations in parentheses) 
 
Variable All  Donors  Others 
Charitable Bequests (CB)  287,326 892,202                   -  
  (11,872,300) (20,909,468)                  -  
After-tax Bequests – Year of death law   
CB(1-T’)  222,947 692,294                  -  
  (10,397,453) (18,314,436)                  -  
CB-T0 114,874 356,700                  -  
  (2,776,766) (4,884,600)                  -  
After-tax Bequests – Phased-in law   
CB(1-T’)  228,732 710,257                  -  
  (10,403,083) (18,323,895)                  -  
CB-T0 126,124 391,638                  -  
  (2,835,278) (4,986,157)                  -  
 
Wealth (W)  1,456,628 2,226,355 1,090,996
 (12,253,134) (21,424,701)  (1,742,053)
 
After-tax Wealth – Year of death law  886,467 1,189,111  742,707
W-T0 (2,960,171) (5,101,403) (707,620)
After-tax Wealth – Phased-in law  950,900 1,277,112 795,983
W-T0 (3,041,600) (5,222,643) (785,268)
  
Share of Wealth – Year of death law   
CB(1-T’)/ (W-T0)  0.0889 0.2761                  -  
  (0.2902) (0.4581)                  -  
[CB-(T0-T)]/(W-T0)  0.0687 0.2134                  -  
  (0.2066) (0.3188)                  -  
  
Share of Wealth – Phased-in law   
CB(1-T’)/ (W-T0)  0.0858 0.2666                  -  
  (0.2758) (0.4337)                  -  
[CB-(T0-T)]/(W-T0)  0.0694 0.2155                  -  
  (0.2083) (0.3213)                  -  
  
Tax Price – Year of death law  0.6503 0.6758  0.6382
1-T’ (0.1029) (0.1522)  (0.0646)
Tax Price – Phased-in law  0.7184 0.7218  0.7168
1-T’ (0.1656) (0.1781)  (0.1593)
  
Age 78.66 81.63  77.24
Male 0.37 0.33  0.39
Widowed 0.76 0.71  0.78
Single 0.16 0.22  0.13
Divorced/Separated 0.08 0.07  0.09
Dummy 1976  0.55 0.56  0.54
Observations 14,051 4,525  9,526
  28Table 3 
 
FIML Tobit Estimates of Charitable Bequests 
Dependent Variable: CB(1-T’)/(W-T0) 
 
  Year of Death Law  Fully Phased-in Law 
Variable Coefficient s.e.  Coefficient  s.e 
 
Constant  -1.8535 0.1423 -2.4979 0.1426
 
Male -0.0370 0.0068 -0.0428  0.0072
 
Single 0.1875 0.0085 0.2013  0.0089
 
Divorced/separated 0.0695 0.0123 0.0780  0.0131
 
Age 0.0083 0.0028 0.0109  0.0029
 
Age
2 /100  -0.0025 0.0018 -0.0039  0.0019
 
Midwest -0.0084 0.0051 -0.0095  0.0074
 
South -0.0205 0.0052 -0.0203  0.0074
 
West -0.0265 0.0055 -0.0360  0.0079
 
Dummy 1976  -0.0062 0.0083 0.0094  0.0085
 
ln After-tax wealth  0.0940 0.0093 0.1334  0.0075
 
ln Tax Price  -0.1237 0.0573 0.0645  0.0373
 
ψ*  2.7974 0.0622 2.5219 0.0488
 
σ  0.1632 0.0015 0.2270 0.0018
 
Observations 14,051   14,051   
Log Likelihood   33,149   32,045   
Φ(z)  0.395  0.337   
        
Charitable Bequests  Wtd. Mean  s.d  Wtd. Mean  s.d 
  Actual  124,000  7,210,600  124,000  7,210,600 
  Predicted  87,600  1,190,400  85,100  1,563,700 
  Predicted w/out tax  84,300  4,686,700  139,100  7,052,000 
 
* Tax price is endogenous to bequests. 
  29Table 4 
 
FIML Tobit Estimates of Charitable Bequests 
Dependent Variable: [CB-(T0-T)]/(W-T0) 
 
  Year of Death Law  Fully Phased-in Law 
Variable Coefficient s.e.  Coefficient  s.e 
 
Constant  -1.6690 0.1259 -2.0444 0.1271
 
Male -0.0336 0.0056 -0.0403  0.0063
 
Single 0.1571 0.0071 0.1767  0.0078
 
Divorced/separated 0.0508 0.0105 0.0603  0.0118
 
Age 0.0080 0.0022 0.0102  0.0024
 
Age
2 /100  -0.0027 0.0014 -0.0037  0.0016
 
Midwest -0.0092 0.0056 -0.0084  0.0072
 
South -0.0200 0.0058 -0.0194  0.0074
 
West -0.0288 0.0060 -0.0367  0.0078
 
Dummy 1976  -0.0081 0.0072 0.0033  0.0073
 
ln After-tax wealth  0.0849 0.0088 0.1028  0.0072
 
ln Tax Price  0.0068 0.0506 0.0635  0.0328
 
ψ*  1.8863 0.0530 1.8393 0.0421
 
σ  0.1800 0.0015 0.2263 0.0018
 
Observations 14,051   14,051   
Log Likelihood   32,609   31,974   
Φ(z)  0.340  0.316   
        
Charitable Bequests  Wtd. Mean  s.d  Wtd. Mean  s.d 
  Actual  124,000  7,210,600  124,000  7,210,600 
  Predicted  104,200  6,314,000  105,300  6,448,800 
  Predicted w/out tax  90,800  4,268,700  108,500  5,134,200 
 
* Tax price is endogenous to bequests. 
  30